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We study the spatiotemporal correlation of terrorist attacks by al-
Qaeda, ISIS, and local insurgents, in six geographical areas identi-
fied via k-means clustering applied to the Global Terrorism Database.
All surveyed organizations exhibit near-repeat activity whereby a
prior attack increases the likelihood of a subsequent one by the
same group within 20km and on average 4 (al Qaeda) to 10 (ISIS)
weeks. Near-response activity, whereby an attack by a given organi-
zation elicits further attacks from a different one, is found to depend
on the adversarial, neutral or collaborative relationship between the
two. When in conflict, local insurgents respond quickly to attacks by
global terror groups while global terror groups delay their responses
to local insurgents, leading to an asymmetric dynamic. When neu-
tral or allied, attacks by one group enhance the response likelihood
of the other, regardless of hierarchy. These trends arise consistently
in all clusters for which data is available. Government intervention
and spill-over effects are also discussed; we find no evidence of out-
bidding. Understanding the regional dynamics of terrorism may be
greatly beneficial in policy-making and intervention design.
terrorist attacks | near-repeat activity | rivalries | social balance theory
Terrorist activities by al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic Stateof Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have brought violence and destruc-
tion to the Middle East and the world (1). Many historical,
political, religious motivations lie behind this unrest and sev-
eral complementary perspectives have been offered to explain
it (2–5). Recent advances in data collection have allowed for
the thorough updating of terrorist databases; being able to
extract information from them may help gain new insight and
yield novel counterterrorism opportunities.
This work examines the spatiotemporal correlation of ter-
rorist attacks perpetrated worldwide by AQ and ISIS, focusing
on the post-2014 era, when they began functioning as indepen-
dent entities. On the local scale, the AQ/ISIS dynamics may
be affected by independent militias or insurgents acting as
rivals or allies to either. These groups are often entrenched in
their communities and may be quite powerful, even eclipsing
AQ or ISIS. Using near-repeat analysis (6–11) on data derived
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), we analyze pat-
terns of attack for three classes of terror groups (AQ, ISIS
and local militias) in six geographical clusters. The latter are
identified through k-means clustering without imposing any a
priori geographical constraints, such as national borders. The
constituency of each class varies across clusters: AQ or ISIS
may have the most combatants in some, in others, local mili-
tias may be the most numerous. Despite cluster heterogeneity,
our findings indicate universal near-repeat activity, whereby
an attack by a given group temporarily raises the probability
of further attacks by the same one within 20km over 4–10
weeks. The variability depends on location and organization,
but groups with fewer combatants are always found to display
the longest period of enhanced near-repeat. While insurgents
are present in all clusters, AQ and ISIS may or may not be;
where they do co-localize, one is numerically superior to the
other and in conflict with insurgents. The two most numerous
groups (insurgents and either AQ or ISIS) are regarded as
major players; the minor, numerically inferior one between
AQ/ISIS, aligns with either of the major two. We also exam-
ine patterns of responding near-repeat, in short near-reaction,
whereby an attack by a given group elicits a response from a
different one. Insurgent activity intensifies after an attack by
a major rival (either AQ/ISIS) while the latter suppresses its
activity following insurgent attacks, leading to an asymmet-
ric dynamic. Aligned groups, allies or neutral parties united
against a common enemy, reinforce each other’s activities so
that regardless of which one strikes first, the other will always
intensify its attacks within 20km. No evidence of outbidding
is found, whereas terrorist activity increases in response to
government action in all surveyed clusters. Our findings un-
derline the importance of local geography and hierarchies in
understanding terrorism.
Historical background
AQ was founded by Osama bin Laden during the Soviet-Afghan
War in the 1980s. Due to intense international pressure after
the 9/11 attacks, AQ evolved into a decentralized “dune”-like
organization (12): its affiliates were encouraged to operate
independently while still being part of its broader network.
Among the myriad of players, ISIS rapidly emerged as a strong
challenger to AQ’s lead. ISIS was originally established in
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Fig. 1. Color-coded geographic clusters of post-2014 AQ/ISIS attacks. Twelve clusters are identified via k-means clustering for their attacks recorded in GTD. Each cluster is
labeled by the country with the majority of AQ/ISIS attacks: Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Nigeria, Pakistan/Afghanistan, Libya, Algeria/E.U., Mali, Philippines, Bangladesh, and
the U.S. The above ordering follows the total number of AQ/ISIS attacks per cluster after the AQ-ISIS rift in 2014. Only the first 6 contain enough data for near-activity analysis.
Panel (a) displays AQ post-2014 activity in each cluster; panel (b) ISIS activity. Each dot represents one attack. Panel (c) shows post-2014 attacks perpetrated by local
insurgent groups co-localizing with these twelve clusters using the same color codes, whereas attacks located outside the same twelve clusters are denoted by light yellow dots.
Jordan by Abu Musa al-Zarqawi in the late 1990s under the
name Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ). In 2004 al-Zarqawi
pledged allegiance to AQ and renamed JTJ al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI). Instructed by AQ to establish a formal governing body,
in early 2006 AQI merged with other insurgent groups to form
the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) and later announced
the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), a centralized
group aiming to occupy the northern Iraqi territories by the
Syrian border. As the Syrian civil war intensified in 2013, ISI
became ISIS and expanded into Syria without consulting AQ’s
general command, creating tension with Jabhat al-Nusra (JN),
a Syrian AQ affiliate. After repeated attempts to control its
expansion, AQ disavowed ISIS on Feb 2 2014. In the years
since, AQ continued fostering local collaborations, including
with al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, while
ISIS expanded beyond its Iraq/Syria base to control remote
territories in Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given their
more adversarial nature and efficient media usage, counter-
terror efforts focused on constraining ISIS, leading to concerns
of indirectly strengthening AQ (13). Since imbalanced in-
tervention may be ineffective (14), better understanding the
interplay among groups may lead to strategies that do not
inadvertently bolster any of them.
Materials and Methods
We examine the terrorist activities of AQ, ISIS and local
groups as listed by the GTD which catalogued global terrorist
attacks between Jan 1 1970 and Dec 31 2017 (15). We mostly
focus on the post-2014 era, when AQ disavowed ISIS.
Data selection. The GTD lists a maximum of three confirmed
or suspect perpetrator groups per attack. We discard entries
with unknown offenders (46% of the total). If at least one of
the perpetrators is an AQ affiliate, the record is assigned to
AQ; similarly for ISIS. If AQ and ISIS are responsible for the
same attack, it is assigned to both. Finally, if neither is listed
as the perpetrator, the record is assigned to the L class (local
militias/insurgents). Affiliates were added to the AQ/ISIS
classes only after their formal acceptance; since during 2004-
2014 ISIS predecessors were recognized as AQ affiliates, their
attacks within this period are assigned to both the AQ and
ISIS classes. Full affiliate AQ/ISIS lists are in the SI Appendix.
Cluster analysis. To examine the spatiotemporal distribution
of AQ/ISIS attacks we first identify geographic areas where
they co-localize using k-means clustering (16). The sole input
here is attack location; no other constraints, such as state
borders, are used (SI Appendix). We identify twelve clusters
and determine the geographic centers and standard deviations
(STD) of each. As shown in Figs. 1(a)-(b) clusters are found to
mostly coincide with geo-political boundaries, due to increased
border security, attacks occurring in civic centers in the interior,
or terrorist familiarity with terrain/culture. In some cases
we observe spill-over or domino effects, due to weak borders
or historical/political precedents (17). The Afghan-Pakistan
cluster arises due to militant groups residing between the two
countries; the Syria cluster is found to include Lebanon due the
Syrian civil war spilling over to its neighbor; the Nigeria cluster
includes small portions of neighboring Chad, Cameroon and
Niger, as Boko Haram attempted to evade government scrutiny;
since AQ affiliated al-Shabaab often launched attacks from
Somalia into neighboring Kenya the two form a unique cluster.
Specific geographical conditions may thus allow terrorism to
spread across borders. To add an L class attack to one of the
clusters identified above we calculate its distance from the
center of the nearest AQ/ISIS cluster; if the distance is within
three STDs from its center, the L class attack is assigned to
this cluster, else it is discarded. The resulting distribution is
shown in Fig 1(c). The six clusters containing enough events to
justify further analysis are listed in Table 1. We focus on them
in the remainder of this work. Major and minor groups are
labeled on the basis of their estimated number of combatants.
The two major groups in Syria and Yemen are known rivals.
Near-repeat analysis. Terrorist events within each cluster are
examined using near-repeat analysis tools developed in crim-
inology (7–11). Near-repetition within the “fixed window”
method is quantified by comparing the distribution of given
data to a hypothetical distribution of random, independent
events (9, 10). This is done by partitioning the given timespan
into several windows of time w; within each window the time
difference 0 < t < w and the spatial distance between every
pair of events are calculated. The time distribution for events
occurring within a a maximum distance d are subsequently
compiled from all windows. This data-derived distribution is
then compared to the random-event hypothesis (REH)
Pd(t) = 2
w − t
w(w − 1) . [1]
Eq. 1 is the random probability distribution for finding a pair
of events separated by a time interval t within w, assuming
2 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Chuang et al.
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Table 1. Active terrorist groups in six significant clusters and their relative strength as measured by estimated numbers of combatants
Clusters Major 1 (number of combatants) Major 2 (number of combatants) Minor (number of combatants)
Iraq ISIS (200K1)
al-Naqshabandiya Army (50K2), PKK (32K3),
Badr Brigades (10K – 15K4).
Syria ISIS (200K1)
The Islamic Front (70K5), Free Syrian Army
(40K – 50K1), PKK (32K3).
AQ:JN (20K6)
Somalia AQ:al-Shabaab (7K – 9K7)
Yemen Houtis (100K8), Southern Movement (N/A). AQAP (12K9) IS:Yemen Province (30010)
Nigeria IS:Boko Haram (20K11) Fulani extremists (N/A)
Afghan-
Pakistan
Taliban (60K12) IS:Khorasan Chapter (3K13)
Estimated number of combatants are in parentheses; N/A indicates they are not available. Major 1-2 groups are known from journalistic reports to
be in conflict. Only the most prominent groups of the L class are listed; attacks from smaller ones are also included in this study. References:
Cockburn P., (2014) The Independent1; Freeman C., (2013) The Telegraph2; Tarihi G., (2015) Sabah3; George S., (2014) Foreign Policy4; Hassan
H., (2014) Foreign Policy5; Kareem B., (2016) OGN News6; BBC News (2017)7; Almasmari H., (2011) CNN8; Roggio B., (2010) FDD’s Long
War Journal9; Aboudi S., (2015) Reuters10; BBC News (2015)11; Dawi A., (2014) Voice of America12; Seldin J., (2017) Voice of America13.
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Fig. 2. (a) AQ and ISIS terrorist activity as percent of world total. Between 2004-2014 the AQ curve includes contributions from ISIS and its precursors. Pre-2004 data in the
ISIS curve is due to JTJ, its first precursor; post-2014 data are attacks by ISIS operating independently from AQ. The limited activity in 2006 is most likely due to the great
regional turmoil at the time, with the media (and the GTD) unable to identify attackers. Indeed, the total number of attacks in the Middle East increased from 2005 to 2006 but
so did the number of incidents with unknown perpetrators. (b) Yearly AQ affiliate attacks. (c) Yearly ISIS affiliate attacks. Note the diverging trends after the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift.
events are uniformly distributed. For example, if w = 7 days,
the probability of two events being separated by t = 1 day is
proportional to the number of pairs separated by one day in
one week: Mon-Tue, Tue-Wed through Sat-Sun, for a total of
six possibilities. Conversely, there is only one possible pair of
events separated by t = 6 days, Mon-Sun. Pd(t) is thus propor-
tional to w− t; the normalization prefactor 2/w(w−1) in Eq. 1
ensures that
∑w
t=1 Pd(t) = 1. Deviations from Pd(t) indicate a
non-random likelihood for an event to repeat after a prescribed
time t. Contrasting observed distributions to Pd(t) is equiva-
lent to performing a Knox ratio analysis (11, 18, 19). However,
the latter requires sampling and Monte Carlo simulations to
generate a randomized distribution for data comparison. Eq. 1
requires fewer assumptions and eliminates the need for sim-
ulations. We set w = 44 weeks, guaranteeing all near-repeat
effects are captured. Feb 2 2014, the official AQ/ISIS rift date,
is used as a starting point from which successive windows of
w periods are generated. To verify whether any biases were
introduced, different w values and start dates were used; re-
sults remained essentially unchanged. Same-day attacks are
discarded, as it is not possible to determine whether they are
part of a coordinated campaign or independent events (20).
Government intervention. Since government (G) activity is not
part of the GTD, we utilize the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP) dyadic dataset (21) to obtain lists of state-sponsored
counterterrorism events. These are then cross-listed with ter-
rorist attacks from the GTD to study terrorist/counterterrorist
interplay. Sufficient data exists only for Iraq, Somalia and the
Afghan-Pakistan clusters where government activities were
targeted at ISIS, AQ and the Taliban, respectively. We use
post-2014 data for Iraq, post-2012 data for Somalia, when
al-Shabaab joined AQ and the Federal Government of Somalia
was established, and post-2003 data for the Afghan-Pakistan
cluster, when the Taliban launched large scale insurgencies
against the Afghan government. There is not enough UCDP
data for Nigeria or Syria (22); it is not possible to identify a
legitimate government in Yemen due to the ongoing civil war.
Results
Al-Qaeda and ISIS activities. Terrorist attacks executed by AQ
and ISIS between 2001-2017 are shown in Fig. 2(a). Until 2011,
AQ contributed to less than 5% of global activity, the ISIS
precursors even less. In 2012, AQ’s activities increased to
roughly 10% of world total, mostly fueled by ISIS and al-
Shabaab as shown in Fig. 2(b). After the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift
the percent of attacks by AQ proper stagnated, while ISIS’s
activity grew rapidly, surpassing AQ to reach almost 20% of
world total in 2017. Fig. 2(c) shows that this increase is due
to greater activity of ISIS proper, but also to the emergence of
affiliate terrorist groups. AQ’s activities post-2014 are mostly
due to al-Shabaab in Somalia. The distribution of terrorist
attacks within the twelve geographical clusters identified in
Chuang et al. PNAS | October 11, 2019 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 3
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Fig. 3. (a) Attack fractions per cluster attributable to AQ and ISIS, 2001-2017. (b) First ISIS attack dates per cluster versus distance from Iraq post-2014. A linear regression
yields a spread of roughly 2400km/year with correlation r = 0.79 and a significant p value of 0.006. (c) Near-repeat patterns for AQ→AQ and ISIS→ISIS worldwide,
2014-2017. Each bar contains data binned over two weeks. Deviations from the REH are estimated using KLD. (c1) The distribution of AQ→AQ attacks separated by less than
20km deviate from the REH over the first 4 weeks, indicating increased near-repeat likelihood. (c2) For ISIS→ISIS attacks the enhanced repeat likelihood is over the first 10
weeks. (c3) and (c4) AQ→AQ and ISIS→ISIS attacks separated by more than 100km follow the REH, suggesting negligible correlation between repeat events.
Fig. 1 is illustrated in Fig. 3(a). In Iraq, AQ attacks mostly
cease after the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift while concurrent AQ/ISIS
activities persist in Syria and Yemen as also shown in the
time-resolved plot in SI Appendix Fig. S2. AQ is mostly
absent in Nigeria, Libya, and the Philippines; ISIS is inactive
in Somalia and in the U.S. We also observe ISIS spreading
from its Iraq base to neighboring countries through the terror
“wave” in Fig. 3(b). Here, the date of ISIS’s first attack in
each cluster is plotted as a function of its distance from Iraq.
The progressive spread of ISIS activities also emerges from
SI Appendix Fig. S3, where attacks are geo-spatially mapped
over time. These findings are consistent with ISIS’s focus on
expansion while AQ’s activities vary in a more random manner,
consistent with its decentralized “dune”-like structure.
Near-repeat activity. Near-repeat results are shown in Fig. 3(c)
where we plot the latent time t between every pair of AQ after
AQ (i.e., AQ→AQ) or ISIS after ISIS (i.e., ISIS→ISIS) attacks
separated by less than 20km or more than 100km, worldwide
and post-2014. For comparison the REH distribution in Eq. 1
is also shown. We use the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD,
SI Appendix) to quantify the deviation of attack distributions
from the REH. Fig. 3(c1) shows that during the first 4 weeks
after an AQ attack, the probability for a near-repeat attack
within 20km is elevated with respect to the REH. ISIS exhibits
an even longer period of elevated near-repeat probability within
20km: 10 weeks, as shown in Fig. 3(c2). At distances beyond
100km, near-repeat effects are negligible and the latent time
distributions converge to the REH, as seen in Figs. 3(c3)-(c4).
Henceforth, we use 20km as the maximal distance for near-
repeat events. Only six of the twelve clusters identified in Fig. 1
contain enough data for near-repeat analysis. Fig. 4(a) shows
the resulting patterns after the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift. All panels
show elevated near-repeat probability for at least 4 weeks.
This period is extended for the minor group in a cluster, as
identified in Table 1, which displays larger deviations from
the REH, larger KLD values, and longer near-repeat periods
compared to the major classes. The trend is consistent across
clusters. For example, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, L (Taliban)
in the Afghan-Pakistan region, and L (Houthi and Southern
Movement ethnopolitical rebels) in Yemen, AQ (al-Shabaab)
in Somalia are all major players, and display enhanced repeat
likelihood over 4 weeks. For ISIS (Boko Haram) in Nigeria
the period is 6 weeks. In clusters where minor players are
also present, they always display longer periods of enhanced
near-repeat compared to the major groups listed above. The
longest period is 14 weeks for ISIS, the minor player in Yemen.
Near-reaction activity. To analyze the post-2014 interplay
among AQ, ISIS and the L groups in each cluster we con-
sider the latent time distribution for A→B events where a
class A attack is followed by a class B attack within 20km for
{A,B} = {AQ, ISIS, L} and A Ó= B. We do not expect symme-
try between the A→B and B→A panels as power structures
may be imbalanced. We omit Somalia, with no significant ISIS
or L presence, and Nigeria where attacks by ISIS (Boko Haram)
and L-class Fulani extremists display negligible overlap within
20km. Fig. 4(b) shows data deviating significantly from the
REH in all clusters indicating enhanced or hindered near-
reaction. To interpret these results and determine whether the
order in which the A,B classes strike and respond is relevant, we
calculate the Shannon entropy contribution Ei for each of the
A→B and B→A datasets in Fig. 4(b). The Ei ≡ pˆi ln(pˆi/pi)
terms allow to compare datapoints (ti, pˆi) from Fig. 4(b) with
the corresponding REH (ti, pi) where pi = Pd(ti) as evaluated
from Eq. 1. Finally, the correlation coefficient r between the
two derived datasets {EA→Bi } and {EB→Ai } is calculated. We
find that within each cluster, only one of the A→B, B→A pan-
els is marked by appreciable negative correlation (r < −0.3,
in red). The respective {A,B} classes are: in Iraq, {A,B} =
{ISIS, L}; in Syria, {A,B} = {ISIS, L}; in Yemen, {A,B} =
{AQ, L}; in Afghan-Pakistan {A,B} = {ISIS, L}. The two par-
ties involved are always either AQ/ISIS (global organizations)
and the local L-class, and are always known to be in conflict.
Table 1 indicates that in all cases the two above classes are
also the largest in their clusters. Our finding of a negative
correlation suggests that an L-class group responds promptly
to an attack by AQ/ISIS while the latter’s response is delayed.
If a third class is present, it is always the minor player listed in
Table 1 and either collaborates (such as AQ and L-class rebels
in Syria) or shares a similar ideology (such as AQ and ISIS in
Yemen) with either of the two major ones. Fig. 4(b) shows that
the minor party always correlates positively with the major
player it aligns with. Correlations between the minor group
and the other major player are not significant indicating that
the major player neglects its smaller adversary to focus on
its main rival. These findings are consistent across surveyed
clusters, and emerge for pre-2014 data as well (SI Appendix).
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Fig. 4. (a) Near-repeat patterns AQ→AQ, ISIS→ISIS, and L→L, in six clusters post-2014. Each bar contains data binned over 2 weeks; all pairs of events are separated by
less than 20km. Heightened near-repeat likelihood is observed at least over the first 4 weeks in all panels. Near-repeat tendencies are more prominent for the minor classes, as
indicated by their KLD values shown in magenta. (b) Near-reaction patterns A→B, B→A, where {A,B} = {AQ, ISIS, L} in clusters where their post-2014 activities overlap.
The first class in each panel is the first to attack; the second responds within 20km after the given latent time. Each bar contains data binned over 4 weeks. The correlation
coefficient r between mirror panels is included for moderate correlation (|r| > 0.3). All known major rivals within each cluster show negative correlation. Panels showing
positive correlation are either allies (AQ and L, Syria) or share ideology (AQ and ISIS, Yemen). (c1)-(c3) Terrorist/government (G) near-reaction patterns; in each cluster the
correlation coefficient r between G and the main class (ISIS in Iraq, AQ in Somalia and L in the Afghan-Pakistan cluster) is shown in black. Each bar contains data binned over
2 weeks. Large r values suggest strong interplay. (c1) In Iraq, ISIS intensifies its activity compared to the REH after G intervention over 4 months; G increases its activity over
4.5 months after ISIS attacks. The agile L class responds to the same G operations by intensifying its attacks over 2 weeks. No consistent patterns arise in L→ G as can be
expected. (c2) In Somalia similar trends arise with enhanced AQ activity after G intervention (4 weeks); G also increases its activity in response to AQ (4 weeks). (c3) In the
Afghan-Pakistan cluster near-reaction is enhanced in the G→ L (4 weeks) and L→ G (6 weeks) panels where L is the Taliban. Although data is limited, we observe a delayed
response from ISIS and an asymmetric G→ ISIS and ISIS→ G dynamic with r = −0.56, typical of near-repeat patterns involving transnational groups. Events separated by
more than 100km follow the REH. Panels with less than 100 data points are not analyzed due to insufficient data. The L classes are as listed in Table 1.
Government intervention. We examine terrorist/state inter-
play in the Iraq, Somalia and Afghan-Pakistan clusters in
Figs. 4(c1)-(c3). In Iraq, the post-2014 G (UCDP data) →
ISIS (GTD data) and ISIS → G near-reaction panels show
both parties displaying enhanced near-response within 20km
over several months. There is no data for government action
explicitly aimed at the L-class in Iraq, however we can exam-
ine whether government operations directed at ISIS indirectly
affect L-class activities. Thus, in Fig. 4(c1) we also study G
→ L (GTD data) near-reaction activity. L responses spike for
2 weeks after G action, most likely as a short-lived immediate
reaction to any nearby event, regardless of intended targets.
No clear L → G trends emerge, implying that government
activity aimed at ISIS is not influenced by prior L-class activi-
ties. Similar trends are observed for the G → AQ and AQ →
G post-2012 panels in Fig. 4(c2) for Somalia, where no L-class
group is present, and in the G → L and L → G post-2003
panels in Fig. 4(c3) for the Afghan-Pakistan cluster (L here
is the Taliban). We also include near-reaction between the
small ISIS group present in the Afghan-Pakistan cluster and
government interventions aimed at the Taliban. Despite the
small sample size of the ISIS attacks, the asymmetry between
the G → ISIS and ISIS → G panels in Fig. 4(c3), is in agree-
ment with earlier observations of delayed responses by global
groups. Large correlation values in all clusters indicate strong
interplay between terrorist/state actors, each aiming to signal
their own supremacy. Except for Somalia, state operations
persist slightly longer than terrorist activity.
Discussion
Near-repeat patterns, often observed in urban crime, also
emerge for terrorist attacks by AQ, ISIS and mostly all other
contemporary insurgent groups, despite heterogeneous local
conditions. The corresponding spatiotemporal scales (20km
and 4-10 weeks) are larger than for urban crime, where effects
persist over a few hundred meters for 2-6 weeks (6, 9, 10). This
may be due to terror attacks being more impactful in terms
of damage, media coverage, psychological effects; longer times
may also be required to orchestrate repeat events. Spatial
clustering reveals territorial effects. For example, AQ displays
a longer period of elevated near-repeat than ISIS in Syria,
but the trend is reversed in Yemen. In both cases, the mi-
nor organization exhibits more prominent near-repeat activity
than the major one, a consistent finding in this work. Why?
We note that numerically inferior groups may need to act
more frequently to maintain visibility, especially in the pres-
ence of more established organizations. This is in agreement
with game-theoretic studies whereby sustained violence allows
small groups of radicals to stay relevant and grow (23). Near-
reaction patterns between major rivals in the same cluster
Chuang et al. PNAS | October 11, 2019 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 5
DR
AF
T
show asymmetric behavior. Typically, one of the two global
terrorist organizations (AQ or ISIS) is in conflict with local
militias/insurgents which respond promptly to AQ or ISIS
attacks. Conversely, the response of the global terror group
is delayed in time. This asymmetric behavior may be due to
local militias having the agility and need to respond quickly,
whereas global terror groups may require longer decisional
times. The remaining group, typically with the least number
of combatants, tends to align itself with one of the major
ones, executing copy-cat or supportive attacks. These aligned
parties may be engaged in a leader-follower relationship, the
minor party may be a supportive ally of the major one, or
the two may be neutral, non-hostile entities united by the
same ideology or intent against the same rival. The trend is
consistent with social balance theory which posits that in a
triadic relationship where two entities are already in conflict,
the only balanced position the third can adopt is to align itself
with one and oppose the other (24). Recent studies on urban
gangs confirm similar dynamics (25). This triadic pattern is
manifest in Syria, where post-2014, AQ affiliate JN began sup-
porting the L-class antigovernment rebels, leading to ISIS→L
rivalry/negative (r/n) correlation, AQ →L aligned/positive
(a/p) correlation, and weak AQ →ISIS correlation. In Yemen,
AQ affiliate AQAP has been a longtime opponent to local
insurgents whereas ISIS established its provinces here in 2015.
AQ and ISIS are rivals but both regard insurgent groups as
their primary enemies, leading to AQ →L r/n correlation, AQ
→ISIS a/p correlation and weak ISIS →L correlation. In the
Afghan-Pakistan region, AQ has mainly assisted the Taliban;
as ISIS attempted to gain territory, it engaged in open conflict
with the Taliban. We thus observe ISIS→L (Taliban) and ISIS
→AQ r/n correlation. There is not enough data to compare
AQ and the Taliban. In Iraq, there is no AQ presence post-
2014, so we only observe ISIS→L (ethnoreligious militias) r/n
correlation. We find no evidence of outbidding (26) in the form
of escalating responses under provocation or when casualties
are involved (SI Appendix) consistent with existing studies
(27, 28). State and terrorist action are strongly correlated,
with long term near-reaction deviations from the REH (SI Ap-
pendix). This indicates both parties prioritize overcoming the
other, and questions the immediate efficacy of state-sponsored
military action. Interestingly the G → ISIS panel in Iraq is
the only one where ISIS does not show a delayed response,
suggesting that when priorities or clear enemies arise, ISIS
does have a fast reaction capability.
Conclusion
We studied the spatiotemporal patterns of terrorist attacks
by AQ, ISIS and local militias/insurgents by applying data-
driven, unsupervised k-means clustering to the GTD. While
near-repeat/reaction patterns are observed in all clusters (29–
31), the accompanying variations highlight the territorial as-
pects of terrorism (32) and the role played by local hierarchies,
even when global terrorist groups are present. Near-repeat
duration, inter-group dynamics and government response de-
pend more on a group’s relative size and on its local rela-
tion to other groups than on whether or not it is part of a
transnational organization. Understanding the local aspects
of terrorism may help policy-makers better plan timing, per-
manence, and expectations of anti-terrorism intervention. Our
correlative observations can help shape statistically optimal
resource allocation and logistics to more efficiently respond to
future attacks. Possible extensions could include constructing
poly-order chains of events to distinguish attack methods and
weapon/target types to further refine the understanding of
repeat activity and the design of response protocols (33, 34).
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1988 Osama bin Laden founds AQ
1999 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi establishes JTJ
2001 JTJ moves its base to Iraq
Oct 17, 2004 JTJ is renamed AQI and joins AQ
Jan 15, 2006 AQI and other five groups form MSC
Oct 15, 2006 ISI is officially established
Apr 8, 2013 ISI is renamed ISIS and expands into Syria
Feb 2, 2014 AQ formally disavows ISIS
Table S1. Timeline of relations between AQ and ISIS.
Supporting Information Text
AQ and ISIS affiliates, and L-class groups in the GTD
Table S1 summarizes key events in the history of al-Qaeda (AQ) and ISIS, as described in the main text. Our attack data
is taken from the Global Terrorist Database (GTD) available from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) which lists events between Jan 1 1970 and Dec 31 2017. According to the GTD codebook, an
event must meet two of the following three criteria to qualify as a terrorist attack: (1) it must have political, religious, or
socioeconomic goals; (2) its intent must be to intimidate or coerce an audience larger than the immediate victims; (3) it must
fall outside legitimate warfare activities, for example by deliberately targeting civilians. Conventional military actions are
not included. Each entry contains time and location of the attack, name(s) of the perpetrator group(s), number of victims,
weapon/target types, among others.
AQ and ISIS affiliates. The first AQ entry recorded in the GTD is dated 1992 and took place in Yemen; the first ISIS attack
is dated 2003, and was carried out by its predecessor Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) in Iraq. Several challenges arise in
identifying AQ and ISIS affiliates. First, they may have used various names and/or spellings depending on geopolitical context.
Spellings may also depend on the sources reporting terrorist activities. For example al-Qaeda is also translated as al-Qaida,
al-Qa’ida, or el-Qaida, and ISIS at times is referred to as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). The GTD unified the
English translation of group names, listing al-Qaeda and all other variants as al-Qaida, and ISIS and all other variants as
ISIL. In our work we use the GTD classification but the more common versions al-Qaeda (AQ) and ISIS. Second, these global
terrorist groups may have incorporated (rejected) local groups into (from) their networks at given points in time, as dictated
by circumstances; some associations may not even be fully clear due to the covert nature of terrorist activities. In our work,
only groups that were officially accepted by AQ or ISIS into their networks, and for which verifiable documentation is available,
are listed as affiliates. Furthermore, we list them only for the period during which such recognition was granted. For example
al-Shabaab of Somalia or Boko Haram of Nigeria joined AQ and ISIS, respectively, after their founding, are included as AQ or
ISIS affiliates after their official pledge dates. Other groups that never formally pledged allegiance to either AQ or ISIS are
assigned to the L class, such as the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistan area. Finally, since ISIS predecessors were recognized as
AQ affiliates between 2004 and 2014, their attacks within this period are assigned to both the AQ and ISIS classes. Between
2001-2017, 6130 (9183) attacks are associated with AQ (ISIS), 3383 (7878) of them took place post-2014. A total of 1328 joint
AQ/ISIS attacks are listed between 2001-2017, of which only 72 are post-2014.
The AQ class thus includes AQ proper (59 attacks in the GTD), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP, 1046 attacks),
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, 282 attacks), al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS, 33 attacks), al-Qaeda
in Yemen (12 attacks), al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (8 attacks), Islambouli Brigades of al-Qaeda (5 attacks), Jadid al-Qaeda
Bangladesh (JAQB, 3 attacks), al-Qaeda Kurdish Battalions (AQKB, 2 attacks), al-Qaeda Network for Southwestern Khulna
Division (2 attacks), al-Qaeda in Lebanon (1 attack), al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad in Sweden (1 attack). Groups founded
under AQ’s official oversight are also included, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN, 344 attacks) and its successor Hay’at Tahrir
al-Sham (HTS, 43 attacks) in Syria, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM, 59 attacks) in Mali. Al-Shabaab of Somalia
formally merged with AQ in 2012, and their 2947 attacks from that date onward were also added to the AQ class. Between
2003 and 2014, ISIS (499 attacks) and its predecessors al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, 639 attacks), Mujahedeen Shura Council (MSC,
8 attacks), and Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, 147 attacks) were part of the AQ network, so we include their attacks in the AQ
class during this period. The Taliban of Afghanistan is considered an independent organization rather than an AQ affiliate
since, despite its well-known ties with AQ, it never formally pledged allegiance to AQ. Note that some of the events listed
above are associated with multiple AQ affiliates, either as perpetrators or suspects, as a result the sum of the total number of
attacks (obtained by summing the numbers in parenthesis above) slightly exceeds the 6130 total.
The ISIS class consists of ISIS proper (5676 attacks), its predecessors, and its various remote provinces or chapters. ISIS
predecessors include JTJ (1999 – 2004, 47 attacks), AQI (2004 – 2013, 639 attacks), MSC (2006 – 2006, 8 attacks), and ISI
(2006 – 2013, 147 attacks). Beginning in 2013, ISIS established itself outside of Iraq and Syria, through the Sinai Province (447
attacks) in Egypt, the Khorasan Chapter (396 attacks) in Afghan-Pakistan, the Tripoli Province (351 attacks), the Barqa
Province (161 attacks), the Fezzan Province (10 attacks) in Libya, the Adan-Abyan Province (50 attacks), the Sanaa Province
(30 attacks), the Hadramawt Province (16 attacks), the Lahij Province (4 attacks), the al-Bayda Province (2 attacks), the
Shabwah Province (1 attack) in Yemen, the Caucasus Province (17 attacks) in Russia, the Algeria Province (10 attacks) in
Algeria, the Najd Province (9 attacks) in Saudi Arabia, the Bahrain Province (2 attacks) in Bahrain, and a few other smaller
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branches in Egypt (22 attacks), Bangladesh (38 attacks), the Greater Sahara (ISGS, 11 attacks), and Jerusalem (10 attacks).
Boko Haram of Nigeria and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) of the Philippines, respectively, joined ISIS in 2015 and 2016, and their
respective 975 and 106 attacks from those dates onward are included in the ISIS class.
L-class local militias/insurgent groups. To analyze the interplay between AQ, ISIS and local militias/insurgent groups that
define the L class, we identified areas where attacks from the L class co-localize with the twelve AQ/ISIS clusters identified above.
We identify 38220 worldwide L-class attacks between 2001-2017, of which 19116 are post-2014. Of these, 13551 co-localize with
the AQ/ISIS clusters. Here we list the names of local groups which contributed more than 20 attacks in the respective clusters
post-2014:
• Iraq cluster: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, 836 attacks, mostly in Turkey), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (56 attacks), Badr
Brigades (54 attacks), Al-Naqshabandiya Army (26 attacks);
• Syria cluster: Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement, 102 attacks), Free Syrian Army (92 attacks), PKK (59 attacks),
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Ansar Jerusalem, 42 attacks), Ajnad Misr (32 attacks), Muslim Brotherhood (32 attacks), Islamic
Front of Syria (32 attacks), Jaysh al-Islam of Syria (30 attacks), Southern Front (28 attacks), Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ, 22 attacks);
• Yemen cluster: Houthi extremists (Ansar Allah, 975 attacks), Tribesmen (56 attacks), Popular Resistance Committees
of Yemen (25 attacks), Southern Mobility Movement of Yemen (21 attacks);
• Nigeria cluster: Boko Haram (before joining ISIS, 615 attacks), Fulani extremists (429 attacks);
• Afghan-Pakistan cluster: Taliban (4128 attacks), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, 401 attacks), Baloch Republican
Army (BRA, 147 attacks), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM, 109 attacks), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, 101 attacks), Baloch Liberation
Army (BLA, 68 attacks), United Baloch Army (UBA, 58 attacks), Lashkar-e-Islam of Pakistan (47 attacks), Baloch
Liberation Front (BLF, 42 attacks), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM, 42 attacks), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (42 attacks), Haqqani
Network (31 attacks), Halqa-e-Mehsud (24 attacks);
• Libya: Ansar al-Sharia of Libya (55 attacks), Haftar Militia (25 attacks);
• Mali cluster: Ansar al-Dine of Mali (48 attacks), Macina Liberation Front (FLM, 28 attacks), Movement for Oneness
and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO, 24 attacks);
• Philippines cluster: New People’s Army (NPA, 1028 attacks), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM, 296
attacks), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG, before joining ISIS, 175 attacks), Maute Group (34 attacks);
• Bangladesh cluster: Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist, 204 attacks), Pro Hartal Activists (91 attacks),
Garo National Liberation Army (77 attacks), United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA, 72 attacks), Gorkha Janmukti
Morcha (GJM, 70 attacks), Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-Maoist-Chand, 66 attacks), National Democratic
Front of Bodoland (NDFB, 53 attacks), National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM, 51 attacks),
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K, 48 attacks), Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA, 46
attacks), People’s Liberation Front of India (44 attacks), People’s Liberation Army of India (40 attacks), Jamaat-E-Islami
of Bangladesh (39 attacks), Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP, 23 attacks), Achik Songna An’pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK,
20 attacks), Rohingya extremists (20 attacks);
• Somalia, U. S., Algeria/E. U. clusters: N/A.
k-means clustering analysis
We examined the spatial distribution of attacks in the AQ and ISIS classes defined above through geographic clustering. We
used the k-means algorithm which assigns each event, in this case an AQ or ISIS attack, to one of k clusters by iteratively
updating the centers of these clusters and minimizing the root-mean-square distance d¯k between the event location and its
assigned cluster center (1). The number of clusters k is a prescribed parameter for the algorithm; d¯k decreases as k increases,
as shown in Fig. S1(a), and is exactly zero when k equals the total number of events, since in this case the location of each
event becomes its own cluster center. Although the goal of minimizing d¯k favors the choice of a large k, decreases in d¯k as k
increases may become negligible beyond a threshold value k∗, indicating that new clusters are not distinguishable from old
ones. The optimal k∗ is often determined by plotting d¯k as a function of k and identifying the value of k beyond which it
begins to plateau. Fig. S1(b) illustrates how we quantitatively identify k∗. We first define Ik ≡ |d¯k+1 − d¯k|/d¯k as the relative
change in d¯k as the number of clusters is increased from k to k + 1 and plot Ik versus k. We find that Ik decreases from about
10% to about 5% when k increases from 12 to 13 and stays well below 10% as k further increases. We thus set k∗ = 12 as the
optimal number of clusters. When k = 13, the Somalia cluster is split in two due to its elongated geographic shape; since all
attacks in Somalia have been attributed to AQ-affiliated al-Shabaab, the cluster should be unique, confirming that k∗ = 12 is
the optimal k value. We set a threshold of at least 100 post-2014 data points per cluster to justify further analysis. According
to this definition, among the twelve identified above only six contain enough data to be used for our near-repeat analysis.
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Fig. S1. Determining the optimal number of clusters k∗. Panel (a) shows that the root-mean-square distance d¯k from an attack location to the center of its assigned cluster
decreases as the number of clusters k increases. In Panel (b) we compute the relative change Ik when the number of clusters increases from k to k + 1. When k > 12, Ik
drops noticeably from& 10% to. 5%; we thus identify k∗ = 12 as the optimal number of clusters.
They are Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Nigeria, and Afghan-Pakistan. Of the others, five clusters have too few attacks for any
statistically significant analysis; they are Mali, Algeria/E.U., Bangladesh, the Philippines, and the U.S. The Libya cluster
has relatively more data points than the previous five, but the attacks are sparsely distributed on a vast area, yielding an
insufficient number of closely separated pairs for us to analyze.
As seen in Fig. 1 of the main text, the twelve clusters are roughly limited by geo-political boundaries and few attacks occur
near the borders; this allows us to name each cluster by the country where the majority of attacks took place. It is important
to note that our k-means clustering uses only attack-location as input and that we did not pre-impose that clusters be limited
by national borders, rather their geographic extent emerged naturally. To verify the robustness of our clustering, we varied the
random number sequence of the k-means algorithm seeding the initial cluster centroids, and found that the spatial extent
of the clusters remained consistent across runs. While most clusters coincide with a single country, a few contain parts of a
neighboring one due to porous frontiers, or shared political and/or historical traits, showing that diffusion of terrorism across
boundaries may be possible under specific geographical conditions (2). For example, Lebanon is clustered with Syria due to
spill over-effects of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon facilitated by fluid boundaries between the two. Similarly, since AQ
used Somalia as a base to launch attacks against Kenya, the two are part of the same cluster. The Nigeria cluster includes a
small area between neighboring Chad, Niger and Cameroon where occasionally Boko Haram has spilled over due to border
porosity. Afghanistan and Pakistan are in the same cluster due to militant groups residing in the tribal corridor between the
two, particularly in North and South Waziristan: the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Khorasan Chapter of ISIS.
Finally, attacks in Algeria, Tunisia and the E.U. coalesce into one cluster due to the small, uncoordinated, number of attacks
on European soil and in Tunisia which are geographically closest to the denser ones in Algeria. For the most part however
attacks are mostly confined within nation states. This may be due to increased military security at the border, or because
borders coincide with natural barriers such as mountain ranges, deserts or rivers where terrorist events would cause fewer
victims, elicit less interest from the press, and garner less attention from the population. Another possible reason is that terror
groups prioritize attacks on “soft” targets where large numbers of civilians aggregate and these are mostly located in major
cities, typically in the interior. Furthermore, terrorists may prefer to act in familiar settings, responding to local sources of
discontent and grievances (3–5). Also note that while AQ and ISIS both aim for the supremacy of Islamic values, they also
establish themselves in territories with pre-existing militant groups that carry different sources of discontent, instabilities,
antipathies, that have existed for much longer periods than the advent of either, so that regionality is to be expected on some
level. Finally, AQ is flexible and operates as a geographically diffused network of semi-autonomous cells, allowing for regionality
to emerge by design. ISIS is more centralized, yet as it conquered or accepted groups that pledged allegiance to it, it divided
its territory into provinces, factoring in pre-existing conflicts and geographical constraints. Indeed, the provinces often coincide
with the countries (or subnational units) they are based in. So although AQ and ISIS are transnational groups, their activities
on the ground are tied to the local discourse and remain clustered mostly in well defined areas. This is also verified by the
location of attacks and origin of their perpetrator groups being always in the same cluster, except for a handful of exceptions.
For example, the Nusra Front and the Free Syrian Armies concentrated all of their attacks in the Syria cluster, al-Shabaab
stays confined to the Somalia cluster, Boko Haram’s sphere of action is the Nigeria cluster. Finally, note that we investigated
possible near-reaction activities over 20km and at the borders between Syria-Lebanon, Somalia-Kenya, Afghanistan-Pakistan,
and across the countries that comprise the Nigeria cluster, and found scant data due to violent attacks being executed near
major cities as described earlier.
4 of 14 Yao-Li Chuang, Noam Ben-Asher and Maria R. D’Orsogna
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year
0
1
2
0
10
20
nu
m
be
r o
f a
tta
ck
s (
10
3 )
AQ
ISIS
world total(a)
(b)
Fig. S2. Yearly number of terrorist incidents from 1970 to 2017. Panel (a) shows the total number of attacks worldwide; panel (b) plots the number of attacks attributed to AQ
and ISIS including their respective official affiliates. Terrorist activities peaked in the mid 2010s and have been declining since.
AQ and ISIS in the context of global terror
Figs. S2(a) and (b) show the total number of terrorist attacks worldwide and those attributed to AQ and ISIS respectively
between 1970 and 2017. The AQ and ISIS world percentages shown in Fig. 2(a) of the main text are derived from these
values. The total number of global attacks increased from 1970 to the early 1990s during the so-called New-Left terrorist wave
(including attacks from the Red Brigades in Italy, RAF in Germany, FARC in Colombia, and Shining Path in Peru to name a
few) which faltered after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A subsequent terrorist wave emerged from religious conflicts in
the 2000s and climaxed in the 2010s. AQ and ISIS follow, and are in part responsible for, the religious terrorist wave: AQ was
engaged in sporadic attacks during the 1990s, over the next decade it intensified its activities as the ISIS predecessors emerged.
As a result, the number of attacks attributed to AQ and ISIS grew steadily during the 2000s and peaked in the early 2010s.
The global number of terrorist attacks has been decreasing since 2015, and contributions from AQ/ISIS have stagnated since.
The GTD does not report data beyond Dec 31, 2017.
Temporal overlap of AQ and ISIS activities in each cluster
Fig. S3 shows AQ and ISIS activities within each cluster as a function of time by binning terrorist incidents in six month
intervals starting from 2012. What emerges is that AQ attacks mostly cease in Iraq after it disavowed ISIS in 2014. Significant
AQ/ISIS overlap is observed in Syria and Yemen. In Syria, this overlap is due to ISIS expanding into the country in 2013,
right before the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift (6) . In Yemen, it is due to the establishment of a new ISIS province in 2015. The twelve
panels are arranged in increasing order of distance from Iraq. The first data points for ISIS emerge at later times in the lower
panels, geographically further from Iraq, revealing a spreading terror “wave” for ISIS. A complementary visualization is offered
in Fig. 3(b) of the main text, as well as in right panels of Fig. S4, where attacks are geo-spatially mapped every six months
beginning in 2012. AQ activities in contrast manifest more random spatiotemporal variation, as can be seen from the left
panels of Fig. S4. The different spatio-temporal patterns characterizing AQ and ISIS may be a reflection of their different
organizational structures, as AQ may be described as a decentralized “dune-like” network of various cells, while ISIS follows
a centralized hierarchy. These structural differences are related to their distinct goals and approaches (7). AQ’s priority is
to eliminate Western influence from the Middle East; terrorist attacks are tools to weaken their perceived oppressors. ISIS’s
preferred action is to expand the territories it controls, attacking unfriendly communities and non-Sunni Muslims. As a result
AQ has developed a large decentralized network of collaborative relationships including with the Taliban in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, with al-Shabaab in Somalia, and with Boko Haram in Nigeria. In these regions AQ rarely operates on its own, but
provides logistic and financial support to local groups, largely without friction. Very few attacks can thus be directly attributed
to AQ, and they are not enough to be statistically analyzed. Conversely ISIS’s strategy has long been to either subordinate
existing groups, as attempted with Boko Haram in Nigeria, or to establish its own terrorist province antagonizing local groups,
as done in Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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Fig. S3. Number of AQ and ISIS attacks per half year in each geographic cluster after 2012. AQ attacks are represented by open circles; ISIS attacks are denoted by solid
circles. Significant temporal overlap between AQ and ISIS activity is observed in the Syria, Yemen, and Bangladesh clusters after the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift. Clusters are arranged
from top to bottom in the order of their distance from Iraq. The first data point for the ISIS attacks shifts towards later times in the lower panels, revealing that ISIS spread from
Iraq first to neighboring countries and later to more distant regions. This figure is complementary to Fig. 3(b) of the main text. AQ shows no such pattern and ceased to operate
in Iraq post-2014.
The Kullback-Leibler Divergence and the near-repeat 20 km threshold
Converting geographic coordinates to distances. For near-repeat analysis, we need to first compute the distance between pairs
of GTD events, which are recorded as longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates (xi, yi) for all i entries. By approximating the
Earth as a perfect sphere, as illustrated in Fig. S5, we determine the distance L between two events as follows
L = REarthθ, [1]
where the radius of the Earth is REarth = 6373 km and where the radiant angle between the two events is given by
θ = 2 tan−1
√
s2
R2Earth − s2
. [2]
The length of the segment s between the two events that appears in Eq. 2 is given by
s = REarth
[
sin2
(
y1 − y2
2
)
+ cos (y1) cos (y2) sin2
(
x1 − x2
2
)] 1
2
. [3]
where xi represents longitude and yi represents latitude for the i = 1, 2 locations.
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Fig. S4. Distributions of AQ and ISIS attacks in the twelve AQ/ISIS clusters plotted every six months from 2012 to 2017. AQ attacks shift around the globe, emerging and
disappearing from one period to the next. In contrast, ISIS has maintained a strong presence in Iraq since 2012, and its attacks have spread out first to Syria in 2014, to other
Middle-East neighboring countries in 2015, and then to more remote regions after 2016.
The Kullback-Leibler divergence. We then utilize the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) to quantify discrepancies between the
observed near-repeat latent time distribution and the random event hypothesis (REH) distribution given by Pd(t) in Eq. 1
of the main text for pairs of events separated by a distance L ≤ d. The KLD is defined as the Shannon entropy of the data
{(ti, pˆi)} relative to the REH {(ti, pi = Pd(ti))}
KLD =
∑
i
Ei ≡
∑
i
pˆi ln
pˆi
pi
. [4]
In Eq. 4 Ei = pˆi ln(pˆi/pi) is the ith data point contribution to the KLD, which quantifies how much pˆi deviates from pi. The
prefactor pˆi places greater weight on events of higher probability and reduces the contribution of fluctuations associated to rare
events. The KLD values depend on d, the maximum distance between two events for which the time lag ti can be calculated.
In Fig. S6 we plot the KLD as a function of d for AQ→AQ and ISIS→ISIS near-repeat events post-2014. There are 204 weeks
between Feb 2, 2014, the official AQ/ISIS rift date, and Dec 31, 2017, the last GTD entry. We calculate the KLD on a sample
of four consecutive w = 44 week windows within the above time frame, and repeat the same procedure ten times by randomly
changing the start date beyond Feb 2, 2014. The average KLD value and the error bars shown in Fig. S6 are obtained over the
effective 40 samples of duration w. For both AQ and ISIS, the KLD decreases as d increases, indicating that the near-repeat
tendency is stronger for events geographically closer to each other, and that the latent time distribution converges to the REH
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Fig. S5. Evaluation of the distance L between two geographic locations i = 1, 2 schematically represented by the blue and red dots. Each location is associated to (xi, yi)
coordinates where xi indicates longitude and yi latitude, for i = 1, 2. The evaluation of L = REarthθ follows Eqs. 1-3 and uses basic trigonometry.
when the underlying events are sufficiently far. In the main text we set d = 20km as the distance threshold within which to
study near-repeat phenomena. This value of d is represented by the second point on each of the curves in Fig. S6. The first
point corresponds to a 10km threshold and has the largest KLD value but also the largest error due to the fewer pairs of
near-repeat events that can be constructed under a smaller upper distance limit. When d = 20km instead, the KLD is large
enough and the error small enough, to distinguish it from KLD values at greater distances, say at 100km.
We also find it statistically significant that for attacks within 20km ISIS expresses a relatively stronger near-repeat tendency
compared to AQ, since ISIS has greater KLD values than AQ and the two data points reside outside their respective error
ranges. As d increases, the KLD value of AQ decreases at a slower rate than ISIS, the gap between them closes, and for
distances of several hundreds of kilometers the KLD value of AQ exceeds that of ISIS. This may suggest a certain long-range
coordination of AQ attacks which may be facilitated by its global network structure. We verified that all results are robust to
moderate changes in w and to start dates beyond Feb 2, 2014.
For near-reaction patterns, we compute the correlation r between the {EA→Bi } and {EB→Ai } datasets, derived respectively
from the A→B and B→A panels in Fig. 5 of the main text, where {A,B} = {AQ, ISIS,L} and A Ó= B. A positive r indicates
heightened attack response probabilities for both the A and B class organizations in response to each other’s attacks; this may
be due to collaborative, aligned, or retaliatory copycat events, for example. Conversely a negative r implies that the attack
likelihood of say, class A quickly increases in response to attacks by class B, whereas class B delays its response after attacks by
class A. This asymmetry may be to to structural differences between the two classes, where for example class B requires more
time to evaluate and organize response attacks to class A. One of the main findings from the main text is that when the three
AQ, ISIS, and L classes are all present in a cluster, one of the transnational groups (AQ or ISIS) and the local L class emerge
as major players, and are in conflict with each other. The remaining transnational group (ISIS or AQ) is instead a minor
player and tends to align itself with either of the major ones. These dynamics are reflected in the post-2014 near-reaction
patterns. Asymmetric A→B and B→A near-reaction activity, and a negative r are found to characterize rival organizations,
where the agile, quick to respond A is the local militia/insurgent group and B the slower transnational organization (AQ/ISIS).
Symmetric A→B and B→A near-reaction activity and a positive r is instead a hallmark of collaborative/aligned groups. As we
shall describe below, results from pre-2014 data are consistent with the post-2014 analysis illustrated above and rival groups
still manifest A→B and B→A near-reaction asymmetry. There is no distinction between AQ and ISIS in any geographical
cluster pre-2014, because either they were either the same organization, or ISIS had not expanded into the region yet; as a
result, no collaborative/aligned relations, and no symmetric A→B and B→A near-reaction patterns are identified. Small |r|
indicates weak correlation; in this case the sign of r becomes irrelevant since the two classes are essentially not responding to
each other. We use conventional criteria and assume that r ≥ 0.66 (r ≤ −0.66) indicates strong correlation (anti-correlation),
|r| < 0.33 represents weak correlation, and 0.33 < r ≤ 0.66 (−0.33 > r ≥ −0.66) is indicative of intermediate correlation
(anti-correlation).
Outbidding
Outbidding is the process of competitive escalation among two (or more) separate but related groups who operate in the same
geographical area and who orchestrate increasingly violent attacks to outshine the other(s) (8, 9). The underlying assumption
is that greater violence shows greater commitment and/or capability and can help garner support from the population. This
mechanism was first proposed in Bloom, 2004 to explain escalating suicide bombings in Palestine by Hamas and Fatah, vying
to be championed by the citizenry. The First and Second Intifadas are sometimes cited as examples of this practice. Similar
phenomena have been described in scenarios that include nationalist, left and right-wing political violence (10), or within ethnic
conflicts (11). At times, caveats have been included such that outbidding will emerge only if communities are supportive of
suicide bombings, or if religiously or nationalistically motivated (12). Other authors have questioned the principle of outbidding
leading to escalation of suicide terrorism and, in general, of terrorist acts of any type. For example worldwide data from 1970
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Fig. S6. The Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) as function of the distance threshold d for AQ and ISIS post-2014. The KLD measures the deviation of observed near-repeat
latent time distributions from the random-event hypothesis (REH). Near-repeat latent time distributions are constructed for pairs of AQ→AQ and ISIS→ISIS attacks separated
by a geographical distance limited by the upper threshold d. Ten periods of 4w = 176 weeks with different start dates are sampled over the 204 weeks between Feb 2,
2014 and Dec 31, 2017. Resulting averages and error bars are shown for various values of d. The curves indicate that a distance threshold of d = 20km provides the most
distinguishable ranges of KLD values from those with thresholds larger than 100km. Overall the KLD decreases for both AQ and ISIS as d increases. At short distances, ISIS
exhibits larger deviation from the REH than AQ, revealing relatively stronger near-repeat tendencies. At long distances, however, the ISIS data deviates from the REH less than
the AQ data, suggesting possible long-distance coordination of AQ activities through its global network.
to 2004 was analyzed in (13). Apart from Israel, little support is found for outbidding, leading the authors to warn of the
dangers of overgeneralizing from a limited set of cases. Others yet have criticized describing even the conflict in Palestine as
an outbidding process and have excluded it from occurring in Iraq, at least prior to the advent of ISIS (14, 15). A frequent
objection to outbidding as a way to bolster support from the local population is that if this were the case, there would be fewer
attacks with unknown offenders as terror groups would better advertise their actions. For the GTD data we analyzed about
46% of the total number of relevant attacks was due to unknown perpetrators. We examined the possibility of competitive
escalation between the major terrorist groups in each cluster where applicable. In particular we consider the Iraq and Syria
clusters, where the major players are ISIS and the L class. Instead of filtering for the number of suicide attacks, we analyze
near-reaction patterns filtering for the number of casualties, as data is more plentiful.
The first scenario considered, shown in Fig. S7 is that of general outbidding, where any type of attack is followed by a lethal
attack from rival groups with at least one, two or three casualties. These panels are denoted as L → ISIS+ (ISIS → L +) where
the presence of casualties is represented by the + sign. For comparison we also replot the L → ISIS (ISIS → L) panels from the
main text. As can be seen, the duration of the near-reaction time window, and the general shape of the attack pair distribution
does not change much when lethality is taken into account compared to when it is. The only trend that arises is the same
observed in the L → ISIS (ISIS → L) panels: the more nimble L class will more swiftly respond to ISIS attacks, to generate
more support or attention, while ISIS will delay its response. The same findings are found in the Syria shown in the right hand
side of Figure S7. Another possibility is that of an incremental outbidding scenario, where a lethal attack with X casualties is
followed by another with at least Y > X casualties (L+ → ISIS++). Various choices for X,Y are shown in Fig. S8; however just
as above no novel trend can be identified compared to the L → ISIS (ISIS → L) panels. We also considered mutually lethal
outbidding, where any deadly attack is followed by any other deadly attack, L+ → ISIS +. Finally, for Iraq we could also
strictly select for suicide attacks, whereas this not possible in Syria due to insufficient data. No novel patterns were found in
any of these cases. The same outcome emerged from pairing major and minor players in all other clusters.
Finally, we examined provoked outbidding where (B → A)→ B attack sequences are compared to general A → B sequences.
In the (B → A)→ B chain of events, B strikes first and the A response is constrained to be within 20km and 4 weeks, defining
a first near-reaction response. We then take this subset of A attacks, which can be thought of as provoked by B, and study
how the B class responds to them, defining a second near-reaction response. Our goal is to determine whether the second B
near-reaction response in the (B → A)→ B sequence differs from the general B response in the unprovoked A → B sequence.
Indeed, if outbidding were at play, we would expect escalation to be manifest in B’s response to provoked A attacks, (B →
A)→ B, through larger deviations from the REH than B’s response to general, unprovoked A attacks, A→ B.
Only the Iraq cluster contains sufficient data for a meaningful analysis. Among the 4575 post-2014 ISIS attacks here, 105
were provoked by L according to the criteria defined above; among the 996 L attacks, 151 were provoked by ISIS. Conversely,
among the 4575 post-2014 ISIS attacks in Iraq, 1330 were provoked by G; among the 2219 G interventions, 1728 were provoked
by ISIS. The above ISIS/G data shows considerable interplay between terrorist activity and the Iraqi government. Provoked
near-reaction panels in the Iraq cluster are shown in Fig. S9: we find no evidence of provoked outbidding either between L and
ISIS, nor between G and ISIS. The panel for (ISIS →L) →ISIS shows in fact slightly suppressed near-reaction compared to
the general L →ISIS case displayed in Fig. S7; similar trends are observed for the (L →ISIS) →L case. We also investigated
provoked outbidding involving the Iraqi government and ISIS. The (ISIS → G)→ ISIS panels show elevated near reaction
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Fig. S7. IRAQ (left): Near-reaction panels L→ ISIS (ISIS→ L) for attacks within 20km of each other; IRAQ (right): Near-reaction panels L→ ISIS+ (ISIS→ L+) with at least
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detected. The nimble L class responds quickly to ISIS attacks, whereas ISIS will require longer decisional and/or organizational time to respond, regardless of lethality. The
same trends are seen in the Syria panels. Incremental outbidding, mutually lethal outbidding, or (in the case of Iraq) suicide attack near-repeat reveal no sign of outbidding.
r = - 0.23
0
0.2
KLD=0.006
KLD=0.011
0
0.2
0 30 0 30
L
+→
ISIS
++
ISIS
+→
L
++
≥ 1 → ≥ 2 kill
r = - 0.29
r = - 0.52
r = - 0.27
KLD=0.006
KLD=0.018
KLD=0.006
KLD=0.024
KLD=0.006
KLD=0.024
pa
ir 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
latent time (weeks)
0 30 0 30
≥ 0 → ≥ 1 kill ≥ 2 → ≥ 3 kill ≥ 3 → ≥ 5 kill
0 30
r = - 0.11
≥ 5 → ≥ 10 kill
KLD=0.062
KLD=0.038
IRAQ
r = - 0.41
KLD=0.013
KLD=0.010
0 30 0 30
L
+→
ISIS
++
ISIS
+→
L
++
≥ 1 → ≥ 2 kill
r = 0.10
r = 0.22
r = 0.14
KLD=0.014
KLD=0.011
KLD=0.011
KLD=0.009
KLD=0.022
KLD=0.034
pa
ir 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
latent time (weeks)
0 30 0 30
≥ 0 → ≥ 1 kill ≥ 2 → ≥ 3 kill ≥ 3 → ≥ 5 kill ≥ 5 → ≥ 10 kill
insufficient
data
SYRIA
0
0.2
0
0.2 insufficient
data
Fig. S8. Iraq (left): Near-reaction panels L+→ ISIS++ and ISIS+→ L++, where deadly attacks trigger deadlier attacks within 20km of each other. Stratifying on the basis of
the number of casualties does not yield any novel trend, apart from the already noted ISIS/L response asymmetry as they react to each other’s attacks. The same inconclusive
trends are seen in the Syria panels.
10 of 14 Yao-Li Chuang, Noam Ben-Asher and Maria R. D’Orsogna
0 300
0.1
0.2
0 30 0 30 0 30
(ISIS→L)→ISIS (L→ISIS)→L (ISIS→G)→ISIS (G→ISIS)→G
pa
ir 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
latent time (weeks)
KLD = 0.012KLD = 0.006 KLD = 0.002KLD = 0.014
Fig. S9. Provoked attack near-reaction panels in Iraq. ISIS responses are not enhanced when responding to provoked attacks by the L class, compared to when responding to
general, unprovoked L class events. This can be seen by contrasting the (ISIS→L)→ISIS panel here with the L→ ISIS one in Fig. S7. Similarly no provoked outbidding is
observed for L responding to ISIS if one compares the (L→ISIS)→L panel here with the ISIS→ L one in Fig. S7. No provoked outbidding is seen either between ISIS and the
Iraqi government forces, which is evident by comparing the (ISIS→ G)→ ISIS panel here with the G→ ISIS one in Fig.4(c1) of the main text or by comparing the (G→
ISIS)→ G panel here with the ISIS→ G panel in Fig.4(c1) of the main text.
as ISIS responds to provoked government operations, however the response is not noticeably different or stronger than ISIS
responding to general G events, as can be seen in the G → ISIS panel Fig. 4(c1) of the main text. Both show elevated ISIS
response likelihood within the first 4 months and the same degree of deviation from REH (KLD=0.014 in both provoked and
unprovoked government operations). No outbidding is observed in the (G → ISIS) → G events either: G responds to ISIS
retaliations indifferently, indicated by the near-REH latent time distribution. The same analysis is not possible for Syria due to
lack of sufficient data.
Our work thus can be placed within the literature warning of the application of outbidding as a general theory: near-response
and near-repeat trends do not seem to greatly change when escalation is included. Perhaps, apart from specific cases such
as Palestine and its unique Hamas-Fatah rivalry, terrorist groups operate in the same way whether or not attacks involve
casualties; whether casualties arise may also be largely out of their control. This is also confirmed by recent studies which
explicitly exclude competitive escalation between AQ and ISIS (16).
Government intervention
The interplay between counterterrorism efforts and terrorist attacks (17) is studied in the Iraq, Somalia and Afghan-Pakistan
clusters, since they are the only ones where sufficient data is available. As mentioned in the main text, we utilize the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dyadic dataset (18) to do this. The data is collected from global media sources and listed in
terms of dyads engaged in armed conflict; players may include state actors. A dyad is considered to be in conflict if both sides
adopt incompatible positions that lead to more than 25 casualties within a year, in which case all related activities are recorded.
We cross-list this data with terrorist events from the GTD to create near-reaction diagrams. In Iraq, between 2014-2017 the
UCDP lists 2230 incidents involving the Iraqi government directed at ISIS; the GTD lists 4362 attacks for ISIS and 996 L-class
events in the same time interval. For Somalia, we study the effects of counterterrorism activity between Feb 9, 2012, the day
that al-Shabaab officially joined the AQ, and Dec 31, 2017. Coincidentally, the Federal Government of Somalia was established
on August 20, 2012. The UCDP lists 1847 events by the Somali government against al-Shabaab while the GTD lists 2850
al-Shabaab attacks within the same timeframe. The Taliban government was overthrown from Afghanistan in 2001, following
the US-led invasion that took place after the 9/11 attacks. For the Afghan-Pakistan cluster thus a natural timeframe for
terrorist and counterterrorist near-reaction studies would be the post-2001 period. Note that the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift is unlikely
to play a relevant role here since the Taliban were never officially part of either AQ or ISIS. Before 2003 however, the UCDP
logs only one incident, whereas the GTD contains only 8 Taliban attacks. This is most likely due to the relatively quiet period
following the Taliban’s defeat: immediately after their 2001 capitulation it underwent an internal reorganization and launched
its first insurgency against the Afghan government in 2003. We thus conduct our analysis of the Afghan-Pakistan cluster within
the Jan 1, 2003 – Dec 31, 2017 time interval. Here, the GTD lists 9406 Taliban attacks and 394 ISIS attacks between 2003-2017;
the UCDP lists 21030 instances of anti-terrorist intervention. Data for Syria is not available, as the UCDP only recently began
translating its polygon dyad system into geographic coordinates; data for Nigeria is not sufficient for a meaningful analysis.
Due to the volatile and complex civil war in Yemen, there are severe ambiguities in identifying the legitimate government. Our
finding of enhanced near-reaction activity between government and terrorist activity, with long term deviations from the REH
in all clusters for which data was available, suggests that state-sponsored military actions may yield increased levels of violence,
at least in their immediate aftermath. Although we consider domestic state actors as compiled by the UCDP (the Iraqi, Somali
and Afghan governments) our findings are consistent with a recent study on foreign military intervention conducted in 122
countries between 1970 and 2015 where foreign counterterrorism action was similarly associated to a short-term increase in
terror incidents (19).
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Fig. S10. Percentages of attacks by AQ and ISIS, including their respective affiliates, in each of the twelve clusters. Panel (a) shows pre-2014 data, when ISIS was mostly
confined to Iraq and Syria as an AQ affiliate. Panel (b) shows post-2014 data, after ISIS began spreading to other regions independently from AQ. Post-2014, AQ’s activities
concentrate in Somalia, Yemen, Mali; in all other clusters where activities are reported ISIS is the most active. The total number of AQ and ISIS attacks per cluster and period is
labeled above the bar graphs. Total numbers increased from pre-2014 to post-2014 in Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Afghan-Pakistan, and Mali; the Nigeria, Libya, Philippines,
and Bangladesh clusters went from nearly no attacks to tens or hundreds of attacks. Conversely, post-2014 attacks in the Algeria/E.U. cluster decreased; there have been no
been direct AQ/ISIS attacks in the U.S. post-2014.
Pre-2014 data
In Fig. 3(a) of the main text, we show how attacks are distributed between AQ and ISIS in each cluster during the time
period 2001-2017. Figs. S10(a) and (b) compare these percentages before and after the 2014 AQ/ISIS rift. Since ISIS was
largely confined to Iraq and Syria at the time, the pre-2014 attacks in all other clusters are almost exclusively due to AQ as
shown in Fig. S10(a), except for a very small fraction (1%) in the Algeria/E.U. cluster. In Iraq, 95% of pre-2014 attacks were
perpetrated by ISIS and its various predecessors as part of AQ’s global network, 3% were by the ISIS predecessor JTJ, which
was never officially an AQ affiliate, and 2% by other small AQ cells in the region. In Syria, 60% of attacks were perpetrated
by AQ-affiliated JN; ISIS as an affiliate of AQ was responsible for 38% of attacks, mostly occurring during 2013 when it
began expanding into Syria. The remaining 2% were earlier 2002 attacks in Jordan by JTJ. After the AQ/ISIS 2014 rift ISIS
overtook AQ as the most attack-prolific terrorist group in most clusters, including Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, Libya, Afghan-Pakistan,
Algeria/E.U., the Philippines, and Bangladesh, as shown in Fig. S10(b). Post-2014 AQ maintained its dominance only in
Somalia, Yemen, and Mali.
Figs. S11(a) and (b) show the pre-2014 near-repeat and near-reaction latent time distributions for AQ, ISIS, and L class
attacks separated by less than 20km in the Iraq, Somalia, and Syria clusters. The others do not contain sufficient pre-2014
data for a significant analysis. For example, the Yemen and Algeria/E.U. clusters display numerous attacks that were sparsely
distributed over large areas, leading to few near-repeat/reaction pairs of events. In contrast, the pre-2014 attacks in Syria
mostly concentrated within two years (2012-2013) over the relatively smaller area of northern and eastern Syria. Fig. S11(a)
shows that the minor classes, defined as those with fewer number of combatants, exhibit more prominent near-repeat tendencies
than major ones, in agreement with results shown in Fig. 4 of the main text. Fig. S11(b) reveals asymmetric near-reaction
patterns for rival groups so that local militias/insurgent groups from the L class respond promptly to AQ/ISIS attacks, whereas
the latter show delayed reactions. This is also consistent with results shown in Fig. 5 in the main text. In pre-2014 Iraq, 95%
of AQ/ISIS attacks were attributed to both since ISIS was considered an AQ affiliate from 2004 to 2014. As a result, the
AQ→AQ and ISIS→ISIS near-repeat patterns in Fig. S11(a) are almost identical, with KLD = 0.023 and 0.020 respectively.
AQ and ISIS also both show slightly elevated near-repeat likelihood within the first eight weeks of an initial attack compared
to the REH; in contrast, the L class shows a much higher near-repeat probability within the first eight weeks after an initial
attack, if compared to both AQ and ISIS, with KLD = 0.18. Most L class attacks in pre-2014 Iraq were attributed to small
groups that executed less than five attacks, in addition to non-specific perpetrators, such as Sunni/Shia/Muslim extremists,
pro-government/Baathist extremists, tribesmen, and separatists. The numerous small terrorist groups most likely reflect the
changing sociopolitical Iraqi scenario, as the initial insurgency against the U.S.–led coalition became an insurgency against
the Shia Muslim–led Iraqi government. The large number of non-specific perpetrators may be due to limited coverage from
the Western press, and possibly because the turbulent and rapidly changing terrorism landscape was largely unstructured or
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Fig. S11. (a) Pre-2014 near-repeat patterns of AQ, ISIS, and L classes in Iraq, Somalia, and Syria. In Iraq and Syria AQ/ISIS were major players compared to the local L class.
In Somalia the AQ→AQ panel refers to al-Shabaab post-2012 (and pre-2014) after it officially joined AQ, while the L→L panel refers to al-Shabaab pre-2012, while it still
operated as an independent group. The KLD quantifying the deviation of the observed near-repeat data from the REH is evaluated for each panel; the largest per cluster is
highlighted in magenta. Note that the L class exhibits the greatest deviation from the REH in both Iraq and Syria, consistent with the hypothesis that minor players manifest
larger near-repeat likelihoods compared to major ones. No such distinction is possible in Somalia since the only group operating here is al-Shabaab, either as an AQ affiliate or
as an independent entity. (b) Pre-2014 near-reaction patterns ISIS→L and L→ISIS in Iraq and AQ→L and L→AQ in Syria. Both cases result in asymmetric latent time
distributions and negative r between AQ/ISIS→L and L→AQ/ISIS. The negative correlation between ISIS and L in Iraq is moderately significant, and is consistent with the
hypothesis of adversary relations between the two classes. The correlation between AQ and L in Syria is weak.
unknown to the outside world during this period. A case in point is the especially volatile year 2006. L class groups associated
with more than 10 attacks pre-2014 include known ISIS allies such as Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna, as well as ISIS
opponents, such as PKK, the Peace Companies (also known as the Mahdi Army), and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq. The great number
of small groups and non-specific perpetrators raises uncertainties as to whether the pre-2014 L class in Iraq acted as an ally or
an opponent of ISIS, or even as to whether it can be considered a unique block. The general understanding however is that
local insurgents mainly expressed anti-ISIS sentiment, as ISIS’s ideological intolerance often exacerbated sectarian conflicts.
ISIS experienced hostility even within its own Sunni-Muslim community, as exemplified by the Anbar Awakening movement
between 2005 and 2008, when local Sunni militias and tribes rose against ISIS in northern Iraq. This conjecture is corroborated
by the asymmetric near-reaction patterns between ISIS and local L class groups in Fig. S11(b), with a moderately significant
negative correlation r = −0.54. This implies that L class groups responded promptly to ISIS attacks, whereas ISIS delayed its
reactions after L class attacks, which is consistent with the post-2014 analysis given in the main text. Since 95% of AQ and
ISIS attacks overlapped in pre-2014 Iraq, the AQ versus L near-reaction plots are essentially identical to the ISIS versus L
ones and thus not shown. Similarly, AQ→ISIS and ISIS→AQ near-reaction patterns are essentially the same as AQ→AQ and
ISIS→ISIS near-repeat patterns and are also omitted.
The Somalia cluster is dominated by al-Shabaab, which was officially recognized as an AQ affiliate in 2012, whereas ISIS is
not present in this region. The AQ→AQ and L→L panels shown Fig. S11(a) both refer to near-repeat patterns of al-Shabaab,
but at different times. Before 2012, as an independent group al-Shabaab exhibits elevated near-repeat likelihood over a period
of 12 weeks after a first attack, as shown in the L→L panel for Somalia in Fig. S11(a). This is longer than the eight-week
period shown in the AQ→AQ panel in the same figure which contains al-Shabaab 2012-2014 data. Over the first eight weeks,
the near-repeat probability is also slightly higher before 2012 (L→L) than after 2012 (AQ→AQ). Since the AQ and the L
classes here do not overlap in time, there is no near-reaction between AQ and L.
In Syria, the majority of pre-2014 attacks took place between 2012-2013 during the Syrian Civil War. ISIS invaded Syria in
April 2013, but there is not enough data to study ISIS→ ISIS near-repeat patterns. Indeed, during most of the pre-2014 era,
fighters from ISIS or its precursors joined AQ-affiliated JN in opposition to other anti-government rebels, so that in Syria AQ
is the major class, followed by the local L class and no significant ISIS presence is found. While both AQ-affiliate JN and
L class rebels exhibit heightened near-repeat probability over the first four weeks, as shown in Fig. S11(a), the near-repeat
probability is especially large during the first two weeks for the L class, leading to a KLD value of 0.13, larger than that of
AQ-affiliated JN, which is 0.055. The pre-2014 L class in Syria consists of the same anti-government rebels as in the post-2014
L class discussed in the main text, including the Free Syrian Army, the PKK, and the Islamic Front. However, the 2014
AQ/ISIS rift changed the relation between AQ and these L class groups. AQ came to Syria through its affiliate JN in 2012
which emerged as an opponent to most of the local rebels. This is reflected in the asymmetric near-reaction AQ→L and L→AQ
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patterns shown in Fig. S11(b) marked by a weak negative correlation r = −0.2. The moderate negative correlation value may
stem from tentative alliances between AQ and local militia groups after the ISIS invasion of Syria in April 2013 which lead to
more symmetric behavior. Nonetheless, the overall weakly asymmetric near-reaction pattern confirms that the response from
the local L class groups is enhanced when AQ strikes first, whereas reactions from the transnational AQ class are delayed,
consistent with findings presented in the main text for post-2014 data. Finally, as discussed in the main text, AQ and local
L class antigovernment rebels became allies against ISIS in post-2014 Syria, leading to symmetric near-reaction AQ→L and
L→AQ patterns, marked by a positive correlation coefficient r = 0.61 as shown in Fig. 5 of the main text.
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